The discussion
Most commenters land on Git needing a direnv-style gate before hooks run, because .git is treated as trusted local state even when a repo arrived as a Dropbox download or a tarball rather than a clone; the post author himself endorses the idea. The sharpest objection comes from agwa, who notes that a plain git clone is safe by design: Git refuses to check out paths under .git/ and treats a clone that pwns you as a vulnerability, so the danger lives entirely in installing a directory tree some other way and anyone who only ever clones is out of reach. The thread also escalates the payload, with agwa’s core.fsmonitor variant firing on a bare git status that IDEs, go build and shell prompts run implicitly, making a shipped .git/config nastier than any hook. A heavily upvoted tip to disable hooks with core.hooksPath /dev/null draws fire when oger points out a repo’s own config can set it back.